Roles of nuclear fuel cycle technologies on geological disposal:

Resilience in management of spent nuclear fuel by development of technology and social agreement

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- Couplings observed in waste management
- Multifaceted performance assessment
- Relation between technology development and social discussions
- Closing thoughts

Final disposal, difficult to realize

- Canada 1998 (Failure in getting public approval for concept)
 - M.V. Ramana, Energy Policy, 61(2013) 196-206
- USA 2009 (Political decision-making)
 - J. Ahn, ATOMOZ, November 2011.
 - C. Singer, *Energy Policy*, **61**(2013) 1521–1528
- Japan 2012 (Science Council's recommendation)
 - J. Ahn, Kagaku (Science), Iwanami, October, 2013
- South Korea 2013 (Deadlocked in US-ROK 123 agreement negotiation)
 - J. Ahn, To be published

Why?

- Lack of <u>reversibility</u> in siting process = Decide-Announce-Defend (DAD) approach
 - Reversibility results from:
 - Adaptive, staged approach
 - Feedback loop between social discussions and technology development
- Dilemma between <u>convergence</u> and sustainable use of nuclear power
 - "Footprint" issue

For ROK, once-through scheme did not work, because ...

- The only parameters that affect the attribute of the materials to be disposed of are time and location.
 - to wait for decay and cooling
 - to site facilities
- This absence of flexibility made the public agreement difficult.
 - only a limited number of stakeholders would agree with the prefixed option.
 - room for adjusting the system to meet the public's wide range of desire and preference is very small.

"Footprint" issue

Dilemma between Convergence and Sustainability

- Spent fuel continues to accumulate as long as nuclear power is utilized.
 - Radioactivity will <u>not</u> reach a steady state as long as nuclear power is generated, and will last much longer than the use of nuclear energy.
- Therefore, repository footprint expands accordingly.
 - <u>(perception issue)</u> The public would not consider this as a solution, but rather consider that the problem continues to grow bigger.
 - <u>(substantive safety issue)</u> With an increasing radioactivity inventory and footprint of a geological repository, potential risk of the geological disposal also increases.

US has many (too many?) options.

- Large territory
- Wide variety in geological conditions
- Wide variety in technological options
- No international constraints as the largest and first weapons country
- Active interactions among law makers, policy makers, regulators, and academia
- BUT,
 - Interactions have been confrontational, sometimes hostile,
 - Because of its own nonproliferation policy, direct disposal has been the only option, and
 - Local residents were not properly involved in decision-making process for YMR siting.

BRC Recommendations (2012)

- 1. A new, consent-based approach to siting future nuclear waste management facilities.
- 2. A new organization dedicated solely to implementing the waste management program and empowered with the authority and resources to succeed.
- 3. Access to the funds nuclear utility ratepayers are providing for the purpose of nuclear waste management.
- 4. Prompt efforts to develop one or more geologic disposal facilities.
- 5. Prompt efforts to develop one or more consolidated storage facilities.
- 6. Prompt efforts to prepare for the eventual large-scale transport of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste to consolidated storage and disposal facilities when such facilities become available.
- 7. Support for continued U.S. innovation in nuclear energy technology and for workforce development.
- 8. Active U.S. leadership in international efforts to address safety, waste management, non-proliferation, and security concerns.

- Final disposal, difficult to realize
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Couplings observed in spent fuel management

- Short term (fuel cycle) vs. Long term (disposal)
 - Short term
 Long term
 - Overall long-term *performance* is dependent on short-term options.
 - − Long term → Short term
 - Without a plan for repository siting, implementation of short-term options is difficult due to lack of public trust and confidence.
- Domestic vs. International
 - Domestic

 International
 - Failure in consuming recovered fissile materials may cause international skepticism.
 - International
 Domestic
 - International and bilateral treaties define framework for fuel-cycle options.
 - E.g., US-Japan 123 agreement negotiation by 2018


Effects of Fuel Cycle on Disposal

- Effects of Storage
- Effects of Separation
- Effects of Sequestration (Waste form)
- Effects of Transmutation

Effects of storage

- Cooling → Improvement of repository safety
 - Reduction of repository footprint
 - Retardation of Engineered-Barrier degradation
 - Reduction of uncertainty in repository performance
- Reduction of radioactivity and radiotoxicity (i.e., source terms)
 - Reduction of adverse consequences in severe accidents
- Increase of proliferation potential

Protection by radiation




Effects of separation

- High heat radionuclides (HHR) (Sr-90 and Cs-137)
 - with short half-lives (about 30 years) and
 - small masses (approximately 4 kg/metric ton of initial heavy metal (MTIHM)).
- Low-heat radionuclides (LHR)
 - with long half lives and
 - significant masses


		HHRs		LHRs		
Time, years	Spent fuel	(Cs and Sr)	U and Pu	Minor actinides	Others	Structure
10	1,443	1,024	185	113	64	48
20	1,096	755	211	90	22	13
50	658	373	228	55	2	0.3
100	356	115	201	39	0.1	0.05
1,000	63	~ 0	54	9	0.02	0.02


Forsberg CW. Rethinking high-level waste disposal: separate disposal of high-heat radionuclides (⁹⁰Sr and ¹³⁷Cs). Nuclear Technology. 2000 Aug; 131(2): 252-268.

Country's nuclear utilization



Convergence of HHR






LHR

- Uranium:
 - occupies majority (~ 95%) of the mass;
 - is hardly soluble and immobile in a reducing environment in groundwater.
- Plutonium, and minor actinides (TRU):
 - are fissionable materials, for which stringent control for safeguard and safety are required;
 - are highly radiotoxic due to alpha emission;
 - are hardly soluble particularly in a reducing environment;
- Long-lived fission products, such as I-129, Se-79, and Tc-99, and Cs-135:
 - are relatively mobile in geological formations, i.e., high solubility and weak sorption retardation with rock during hydrological transport by groundwater

Effects of waste forms/canisters

- Radionuclide loadings in waste form →
 Determines the number of canisters and footprint
 - Heat emission
 - Proliferation resistance
 - Radionuclide release rates
- Dissolution rates of waste form
 - Radionuclide release rates
 - Alteration of near-field environment
- Choice of backfill/buffer materials


Effects of Transmutation




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
With solubility limited mechanism, repository performance is controlled by S/V ratio.

Uniform Groundwater Water Flux



With no heat emission, a big sphere gives the best performance.





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- Final disposal, difficult to realize
- Couplings observed in waste management
- Multifaceted performance assessment

 Taking Japanese case as an example
- Relation between technology development and social discussions
- Closing thoughts

Conventional vs. Multifaceted performance assessment

- <u>Conventional PA</u> is done to confirm that a certain system comprises with regulatory guidelines.
- <u>Multifaceted PA</u> is done to compare performance of multiple options from multiple <u>viewpoints</u>.

Multifaceted PA

- <u>In the first round</u>, "cost" comparison should not be the primary viewpoint.
 - Remember Muskie Act 1970.
 - How to frame the problem?
- Once the public understands and shares what the society would like to achieve, cost will become the primary issue, but can be solved by technological development and breakthrough.
 - Cf. Discussion after Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan is misaddressed because cost comparison seems to be the most decisive factor.

Issues that Japan faces -- Short and Mid-term ranges --

- National wealth is draining out.
 - Import of fossil fuels
 - Additional 4 trillion yen/year
 - Additional 175 million ton CO2 emission /year
 - Huge investment could become irrecoverable.
 - Nuclear power plants,
 - Rokkasho reprocessing plant
- International competitiveness and influence are being lost.
- Pu stockpile can complicate US-Japan bilateral relation.


Issues that Japan faces -- Long-term range --

- Risk to be imposed on future generations is heavily dependent on options taken in short and mid-term ranges.
 - Amount and contents to be disposed of become substantially different.
 - Technologies available in future will be different, or maybe decreased.
- Options for mitigating global warming issues will be limited.

Options


• Option (0) : Full-fledged fuel cycle

- Maintain the same fleet capacity (e.g., 50 LWRs equivalent; includes FBRs)
- PUREX (U, Pu recovered)
- Recovery of TRU for transmutation
- Disposal: HLW vitrified waste (legacy + future)
- Option (IV) : Phase out immediately
 - Disposal : HLW vitrified waste (legacy), Pu stockpile, Spent fuel including MOX, Recovered U



• Option(I)

- Fleet capacity that can be accommodated by Rokkasho capacity
- Old reactors replaced as needed
- PUREX (U, Pu recovered)
- MOX
- Disposal: HLW vitrified waste (legacy + future), MOX SF, Recovered U
- Option(II)
 - Fleet capacity that can be accommodated by Rokkasho capacity
 - No LWR replacement; HTGR
 - PUREX (U, Pu recovered)
 - TRISO
 - Disposal: HLW vitrified waste (legacy), TRISO, Recovered U



- Option(III)
 - No replacement of reactors
 - No reprocessing
 - Legacy Pu is made into MOX and used in remaining LWRs
 - Disposal: HLW vitrified waste (legacy), MOX SF, Spent fuel, Recovered U

Long term

Radiological performance	
of repository	

Radiological performance of fuel cycle

Proliferation resistance of a geological repository

International competitiveness and influence

Domestic

Recovery of investment; National wealth International

Bilateral relations with US (and others)




Performance Viewpoints (Domestic)


- Radiological performance of repository
 - difficulty for meeting regulatory requirements;
 - radiological risk resulting from a severe accident.
- Radiological performance of fuel cycle
 - complexity of processes and activities included in respective options, and so
 - amount of regulatory work necessary to maintain normal operation
- Recovery of investment; National wealth
 - Utilization of existing facilities


Performance Viewpoints (International)


- Proliferation resistance of a geological repository
 - attractiveness as weapons-usable materials.
- International competitiveness and influence


 Economical, technological, political
- Bilateral relations with US (and others)
 - Pu stockpile











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Aftermath of Fukushima -- Discussions for "better" systems --

- More robust reactors
- Capable operator
- Competent and independent regulatory system
- Energy security/independence
- Accident mitigation & damage minimization
 - Which part of the society has actually been damaged?

Resilient nuclear technology

Resilience of a reactor

- Advanced reactors and fuels (inherently safe reactors)
- Back-fit of existing reactors
- Resilience of a fleet of reactors/fuel cycles
 - Replacement of old reactors with new reactors
 - Spent fuel/high-level waste treatment and disposal
- Resilience of energy portfolio
 - Flexibility of adjusting (increase or decrease) share of nuclear power, depending on situations/needs
- Resilience of society
 - Public-participatory system for decision making,
 - Complicated stakeholders

Where should public participation be implemented?

- Selection of viewpoints for multifaceted assessment
 - Different stakeholders would have different priorities, and thus consider different sets of viewpoints more important or crucial.
 - However, including too many viewpoints would not make assessment useful for grasping trade-off relations embedded in the current issue.
 - This leads to an idea of establishing a committee with participation of various stakeholders for the purpose of selecting a relatively small number of viewpoints for multifaceted assessment.
- Evaluation/ranking with respect to each viewpoint
 - While this has been done historically by judgment of technical experts, evaluation can and should also be done by public participation.
 - Multiple sets of results for different population could be obtained and compared.

Closing thoughts

- Nuclear fuel cycle technology plays crucial roles in augmenting technological options.
- BUT,
- Technological development should be carried under the guidance of, and to serve for, public-participatory, reversible and adaptive decision making, which is essential for social resilience.
- For such decision-making process, multifaceted performance assessment for technological options plays an important role.
 - Performance metrics, based on in-depth analysis of issues that the society faces, and the goal that the society agrees.
 - PA should be conducted not only by experts but also by lay people.
 - Metrics, goals, and assessment should be done iteratively.